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Speculation over the nominee for the next President of the European Commission has been rife in newspapers,
media and the blogosphere. In the face of such uncertainty, it might be reassuring to believe that, as Mattias
Kumm asserts, there is an actual legal duty to appoint a particular candidate. No such luck. If there was to be
legal certainty, then the authors of the treaty could quite easily have provided that clarity, including by
institutionalising the Spitzenkandidat concept in the treaties. They did no such thing. Instead what they did was
mandate institutional deliberation over the nominee under a penalty default of a European Parliament veto. Far
from the legal architecture creating a duty to appoint a particular candidate, it creates the conditions for
deliberation over (a) what the recent elections to the EP mean (itself a matter for political debate and
contestation) and (b) how to translate complex and sometimes contradictory political messages into the
programme of the next European Commission and its President. This interpretation requires some elaboration.
Kumm’s argument appropriately seeks to marry together the text of the treaties with where the EU is now in
political and democratic terms. Let’s start with what the treaties do – and importantly – do not say. Article 17(7)
TEU states:
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the
appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to
the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission.This candidate shall be
elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.
If the candidate so nominated does not command a majority then within one month the European Council shall
propose another nominee.
What is obvious is that there is no mention of Spitzenkandidat or any other means by which the EP might first
nominate a candidate for consideration by the European Council. You can take a view on whether this most
indirect means of selecting the EP’s ‘candidate’ is a good or a bad way of representing the voice and vision of a
majority of Europeans – or indeed whether it might in the future become a mobilising force – but on one thing the
treaties are crystal clear: the EP has no competence to propose a nominee for the European Commission
presidency. Inside the EP bubble it might have felt as though it had such an institutional power and the rival
‘candidates’ might have indulged in the charade that the EP could exercise such a power, but wishful thinking
does not a treaty make.
So the important point is that the power to nominate the President of the European Commission rests where it
has always rested, namely with the Heads of State and Government of the Member States meeting in the
European Council. Indeed, for the European Council to be under a duty to appoint a candidate nominated by
another EU institution would itself amount to an unlawful delegation of its responsibilities contrary to the precise
wording and intent of the treaties. The changes which have been made to the treaties to require that the
European Council take into account the EP elections, to conduct consultations and to give the EP a veto cannot
detract from the fundamental legal responsibility of the European Council to select a nominee.
As between the power of the European Council to nominate and the power of the EP to veto there is a need for
institutional dialogue. Kumm is right that depending on the circumstances and outcome of the EP election, the
candidacy of some candidates rather than others may be more compelling in political terms. Leaving aside the
tendency for the Spitzenkandidat concept to create a sense of legal entitlement, it is one – albeit only one –
plausible way of thinking about who would make a good nominee. But again, the choice of language of the treaty
is what is interesting. The substantive requirement that is to guide the process is the open-ended ‘taking into
account the elections’. The last round of elections can be read in a range of ways. On the one hand fringe and
extremist parties have had some electoral success. One view may be to respond to this Euroscepticism and
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another may be to seek to reject it. On the other hand, the middle-ground has held up. One view may be that this
consensus should be preserved while another may argue that it is this consensus which also fuels
Euroscepticism. The point is simply that the conflicting messages of the European polity need to be decoded and
deliberated. The idea that we ought to eschew a deliberative process designed to work out where the EU should
be going, in favour of a legal duty to appoint a particular EP nominee is not just to be wrong on the law, it’s to get
the politics that underpins the law entirely wrong.
Of course, the EP does have the institutional power to veto. But in the long run that is to no one’s advantage and
ultimately could be argued to be a violation of the legal duty of sincere cooperation insofar as a repeated
exercise of the veto sought to compel the European Council effectively to delegate its power of nomination to the
EP. The better way to view the veto is as a penalty default. The role of penalty defaults is to encourage
participants to reach an agreed outcome that is superior than either the certainty of an outcome that no
participants in the deliberation would wish or the uncertainty of the failure to agree on an outcome and the
paralysis it would create. In this way, penalty defaults can be deliberation-inducing.
Kumm’s analysis of what the treaty says about the democratic principle in the EU is as irresponsibly over-
optimistic about the capacity of the EP to generate a genuine representative European democracy as it is
neglectful of the powerful capacity of the European Council – through its representation of individuals
democratically accountable to their own national electorates – to seek also to promote a vision of a common
European good. What Europe needs is deliberation within the European Council and between the European
Council and the EP. It’s also what the treaties mandate.
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